Replication data for: Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Esther Duflo; Rema Hanna; Stephen P. Ryan

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
Incentives_FINAL			08/02/2019 07:24:PM
Structural-Programs			08/02/2019 07:24:PM
Read-Me.txt	text/plain	409 bytes	08/02/2019 03:24:PM

Project Description

Summary: We use a randomized experiment and a structural model to test whether monitoring and financial incentives can reduce teacher absence and increase learning in India. In treatment schools, teachers' attendance was monitored daily using cameras, and their salaries were made a nonlinear function of attendance. Teacher absenteeism in the treatment group fell by 21 percentage points relative to the control group, and the children's test scores increased by 0.17 standard deviations. We estimate a structural dynamic labor supply model and find that teachers respond strongly to financial incentives. Our model is used to compute cost-minimizing compensation policies. (JEL I21, J31, J45, O15)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      O15 Human Resources • Human Development • Income Distribution • Migration
      J31 Wage Level and Structure • Wage Differentials
      J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
      I21 Analysis of Education

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-08-02]

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