Replication data for: Do Larger Health Insurance Subsidies Benefit Patients or Producers? Evidence from Medicare Advantage
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Marika Cabral; Neale Mahoney; Michael Geruso
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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Replication-final | 08/02/2019 11:44:PM | ||
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text/plain | 14.6 KB | 08/02/2019 07:44:PM |
Project Citation:
Project Description
Summary:
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A central question in the debate over privatized Medicare is whether increased government payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans generate lower premiums for consumers or higher profits for producers. Using difference-in-differences variation brought about by a sharp legislative change, we find that MA insurers pass through 45 percent of increased payments in lower premiums and an additional 9 percent in more generous benefits. We show that advantageous selection into MA cannot explain this incomplete pass-through. Instead, our evidence suggests that market power is important, with premium pass-through rates of 13 percent in the least competitive markets and 74 percent in the most competitive.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
G22 Insurance • Insurance Companies • Actuarial Studies
I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
H51 Government Expenditures and Health
I18 Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health
I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
G22 Insurance • Insurance Companies • Actuarial Studies
I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
H51 Government Expenditures and Health
I18 Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health
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