Replication data for: Cooperation in Polygynous Households
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Berber Kramer; Wendy Janssens; Bereket Kebede; Marleen Dekker; Abigail Barr
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Project Description
Summary:
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Using a carefully designed series of public goods games, we compare, across monogamous and polygynous households, the willingness of husbands and wives to cooperate to maximize household gains. Compared to monogamous husbands and wives, polygynous husbands and wives are less cooperative, one with another, and co-wives are least cooperative, one with another. The husbands' and wives' behavior in a corresponding series of inter-household games indicates that these differences cannot be attributed to selection of less cooperative people into polygyny. Finally, behavior in polygynous households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
D13 Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
C93 Field Experiments
J12 Marriage • Marital Dissolution • Family Structure • Domestic Abuse
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
D13 Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
C93 Field Experiments
J12 Marriage • Marital Dissolution • Family Structure • Domestic Abuse
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