Replication data for: Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) M. Marit Rehavi; Erin M. Johnson

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
CaFinal			08/03/2019 09:01:AM
TxFinal			08/03/2019 09:01:AM
README.pdf	application/pdf	27.9 KB	08/03/2019 05:01:AM

Project Description

Summary: This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable nonphysicians. We also exploit the presence of HMO-owned hospitals to determine how the treatment gap varies with providers' financial incentives. Consistent with induced demand, physicians are approximately 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting. While financial incentives affect the treatment of nonphysicians, physician-patients are largely unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes. (JEL D83, I11, J16, J44)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
      D83 Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
      J16 Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination
      J44 Professional Labor Markets • Occupational Licensing

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-08-03]

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DDI 2.5

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