Replication data for: Selection Bias, Demographic Effects, and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Marco Casari; John C. Ham; John H. Kagel
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Project Description
Summary:
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Inexperienced women, along with economics and business majors, are much
more susceptible to the winner's curse, as are subjects with lower SAT/ACT
scores. There are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced
and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who
have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects. These
selection effects are not identified using standard econometric techniques but
are identified through experimental treatment effects. Ignoring these selection
effects leads to misleading estimates of learning. (JEL D44, D83, J16)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D44 Auctions
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
D44 Auctions
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
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